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SWINGING FOR THE FENCES: HOW 
COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. 





This Comment offers a critical analysis of the recent decision of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc.  First, the Comment discusses the facts of the case and the 
decisions leading up to the en banc decision.  The Comment goes on to 
review the evolution and purposes of the plain view doctrine.  The Comment 
then argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. represents an overreaction to the privacy concerns raised by 
the application of the plain view doctrine to digital searches.  Finally, it 
will advocate that courts continue to apply the plain view doctrine to digital 
searches, subject to heightened scrutiny by judges, who should grant 
warrants only when it is reasonable to do so in light of the strength of the 
probable cause, the severity of the crime being investigated, and voluntary 
actions taken by the government to reduce the social cost of the privacy 
intrusion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As digital technology has become ubiquitous and inexpensive, more 
and more criminals leave digital trails.  However, those trails commonly 
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lead through large databases, filled with data unrelated to any crime and 
bearing a high expectation of privacy.  This poses a serious challenge to 
investigators attempting to retrieve the relevant data using a minimum 
amount of time and with the respect for the privacy of those searched that 
the Constitution requires.  Because digital records are fungible and easily 
disguised or hidden, these searches sometimes require a file-by-file search 
of seized databases, forcing increased expenditures on conducting the 
search and increased privacy intrusions.  This has challenged trial and 
appellate courts to develop a practical approach to preserving civil rights 
against unreasonable searches and unparticularized searches. 
A recent en banc Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., attempted to do just that, adopting a 
series of procedural requirements for digital searches in criminal cases that 
appear to provide strong protections for digital privacy at the cost of placing 
a significant burden on the ability of law enforcement to pursue digital 
crimes.1
II. THE BALCO INVESTIGATION AND COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. 
  This Comment will argue that, although digital searches raise 
valid Fourth Amendment concerns, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is 
excessive and inefficient, and that a more flexible approach, based on the 
balancing of government interests, privacy interests, and the probability of a 
successful search, is preferable.  Part II will review the facts and procedural 
history of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.  Part III will briefly revisit the 
history of the plain view doctrine and evaluate its applicability to digital 
searches.  Part IV will discuss the variety of approaches proposed by other 
courts and scholars.  Finally, Part V will argue that the most efficient 
approach to regulating digital searches is one where courts balance privacy 
interests with society’s interests in detecting crime and encourage 
investigators to offer search methods that are respectful of privacy interests 
as well as reasonably efficient and effective.  Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. holding fails to strike 
a proper balance and is as a result impractical and inefficient. 
In August 2002, the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal 
Investigations Unit began a grand jury investigation into the Bay Area Lab 
Cooperative (BALCO).2
 
1 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.) (en banc), rev’g 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 
2006) (2–1). 
  BALCO was a small lab which had several high-
profile athletes as clients, including Barry Bonds, a Major League Baseball 
2 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2006) 
[hereinafter CDT I]; MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS 153 
(2006).  
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player who hit a record seventy-three home runs during the 2001 season.3  
Federal investigators suspected that BALCO had provided Bonds and other 
athletes with performance-enhancing drugs.4  They soon confronted the 
owner of BALCO, Victor Conte, who confessed to having developed and 
distributed two performance-enhancing drugs, known as “The Clear” and 
“The Cream.”5  The investigation expanded its focus to the athletes who 
had been using those chemicals.  A grand jury convened in September 2003 
and began subpoenaing athletes with connections to BALCO.6
In November 2002, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on 
Major League Baseball (MLB), seeking drug testing information for ten 
players.
 
7  It also subpoenaed the records of the ten players from two drug 
testing companies retained by MLB to carry out its drug testing policies: 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT) and Quest Diagnostic Labs 
(Quest).8  The Major League Baseball Players Association (Players 
Association) filed a motion to quash the subpoenas in the Northern District 
of California.9
While the Northern District considered that motion, the Government 
requested a search warrant from magistrate judges in the Central District of 
California and the District of Nevada.
 
10  The warrants authorized the 
seizure of drug test records and specimens for the ten BALCO-connected 
players, as well as materials explaining CDT’s procedure for administering 
the MLB drug-testing program, including correspondence and e-mails.11  
The Government executed the warrant at CDT, where it obtained records 
listing the players that CDT had tested along with the identifying numbers 
CDT used to label their documents and information.12
 
3 FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 
  A CDT director also 
provided the agents with a physical document that contained testing results 
2, at 153; CDT I, 473 F.3d at 920. 
4 FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 153. 
5 Id. at 178.  “The Clear” was a norbothelone, an obscure anabolic steroid not detected by 
most steroids tests at the time.  Id. at 57.  “The Cream” was a mix of testosterone and 
epitestosterone designed to conceal the use of norbothelone.  Id. at 178. 
6 Id. at 190.  The athletes came from a wide variety of sports including baseball, football, 
Olympic track and field, professional boxing, swimming, cycling, and bodybuilding.  Id. 
7 CDT I, 473 F.3d at 920.  The Government initially subpoenaed eleven players’ records, 
then notified CDT that they were no longer seeking records for one of those players.  Id. at 
920 n.7. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 921.  The decision also discussed the standing of the Players Association to sue 
on behalf of the players and MLB, but that subject is not otherwise discussed in this paper.  
See id. 925–26. 
10 Id. at 921. 
11 Id. at 924. 
12 Id. at 922. 
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for the ten BALCO players.13  When another director informed the agents 
that the digital records of CDT’s drug testing programs were maintained on 
a computer directory called the “Tracy” directory, an agent created a digital 
copy of the directory for analysis off-site.14
A. DISTRICT COURT 
 
The Players Association filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(g) in the Central District of California, asking for the return of 
the electronic records not related to the BALCO players.15  The motion was 
granted by Judge Cooper, who rejected the Government’s argument that the 
electronic documents seized were legally seized as plain view contraband 
and therefore not subject to a 41(g) motion.16  The Players Association filed 
a similar order in the District of Nevada (where Quest is located), which 
was granted by Judge Mahan.17  In granting the motion, Judge Mahan found 
that “[t]he government callously disregarded the affected players’ 
constitutional rights” and had not followed the Ninth Circuit’s procedural 
guidelines for searches of intermingled records laid out in United States v. 
Tamura.18  He also found that the Government had misled the magistrate 
judge in obtaining the warrant by claiming that the records were in danger 
of being destroyed.19
B. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING INC. I 
 
The Government appealed the orders of Judges Cooper and Mahon 
and the appeals were consolidated and heard by a Ninth Circuit panel.20  
The panel reversed the lower court orders.21
 
13 Id. 
  The majority opinion held that 
the district court had improperly granted the 41(g) motions.  It noted that 
14 Id. at 922–23. 
15 Id. at 923.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) provides: 
Motion To Return Property.  A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property 
or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.  The motion must be filed 
in the district where the property was seized.  The court must receive evidence on any factual 
issue necessary to decide the motion.  If it grants the motion, the court must return the property 
to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use 
in later proceedings. 
16 CDT I, 473 F.3d at 924. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  The procedural requirements of United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 
1982), are discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.  
19 CDT I, 473 F.3d at 930. 
20 Id. at 915–16. 
21 Id. at 930. 
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the judges’ orders, which required the return of all CDT and Quest records, 
were inconsistent with precedent.22  It further noted that courts typically 
deny 41(g) motions in situations where “the government’s need for the 
property as evidence continues” even though some unlawfully obtained 
evidence may be intermingled.23  The panel also held that the Tamura 
procedures were “pragmatic” rather than constitutional in nature and thus 
not required.24  The majority declined to decide whether or not the “plain 
view” exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, noting that the 
documents seized by the Government had been within the scope of their 
warrant.25
C. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. II 
 
The case was reheard en banc by the Ninth Circuit where, writing for 
the majority, Chief Judge Kozinski reversed the decision of the three-judge 
panel.26  The opinion reviewed the Government’s actions in the context of 
its previous decision, United States v. Tamura.27  That case stemmed from a 
government kickback investigation into a manager (Tamura) at an 
American company.28  The Government obtained a search warrant to seize 
particular records at the company.29  The necessary records were 
intermingled with non-pertinent records and required a multi-step process to 
identify and segregate.30  In order to avoid several days of searching for 
documents on-site, the Government decided to seize all of the corporation’s 
records for the relevant time periods.31  The search ultimately supplied 
evidence relevant to the investigation.32  Tamura sought to suppress the 
evidence after the Government failed to return segregated non-pertinent 
files to the corporation.33
 
22 Id. at 937. 
  The court held that the Government’s “wholesale 
seizure” of documents not specified in the warrant constituted an 
23 Id. (quoting United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 388 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
24 Id. at 938. 
25 Id. at 935 n.39. 
26 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) [hereinafter CDT II]. 
27 Id. at 998 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
28 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 594. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 594–95. 
31 Id. at 595.  The court ultimately concluded that the Government’s actions did not 
constitute a reversible error.  Id. at 597. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 594–95. 
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“investigatory dragnet” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.34  The 
decision endorsed an approach described by the American Law Institute’s 
Model Code for Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which states that once police 
seize intermingled documents, they are to be held under seal and cannot be 
searched until a neutral magistrate conducts a hearing on the least intrusive 
method for searching the files.35
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. en banc panel noted that the 
point of the Tamura procedures was to “maintain the privacy of materials 
that are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid turning a limited 
search for particular information into a general search.”
 
36  It found that the 
Government’s decision to conduct a search of the entire hard drive with the 
discretion to exercise plain view was incompatible with this purpose.37  
Based on this observation and other issues related to the Government’s 
failure to appeal in a timely manner, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court orders.38
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view 
doctrine in digital evidence cases. 
  In addition, in a section titled “Concluding Thoughts,” it 
laid out several holdings describing a set of procedures that magistrate 
judges and government investigators must “be vigilant in observing” when 
searching intermingled electronic data. 
2. Segregation and redaction must either be done by specialized personnel or an 
independent third party . . . .  If the segregation is to be done by government computer 
personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will 
not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of 
the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information 
as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. 
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the 
information for which it has probable cause and only that information may be 
examined by the case agents. 
 
34 Id. at 595. 
35 Id. at 595–96 (citing Section SS 220.5 of the 1975 ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE). 
36 CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1007. 
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5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return 
non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed when they have done so 
and what was kept.39
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision is a radical approach 
to maintaining the protections of the Fourth Amendment in a digital age and 




39 Id. at 1006 (internal citations omitted).  Shortly prior to the publication of this 
Comment, the Ninth Circuit revisited its decision.  United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 2010 WL 3529247 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 
2010), revising and superceding 579 F.3d at 989 [hereinafter CDT III].  The revised opinion, 
now per curiam, still reversed the CDT I opinion, however, much of Judge Kozinski's 
mandatory language was moved to a concurrence section, joined by Judges Kleinfeld, W. 
Fletcher, Paez, and M. Smith, indicating that Judges Graber, Wardlaw, and Berzon, had 
withdrawn their support for that section.  Id. at *1, *14; see also Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit 
Balks in BALCO Case, Denying Super En Banc in United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing but Amending Opinion to Remove Challenged Section, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 13, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/13/ninth-circuit-balks-in-balco-case-
denying-super-en-banc-in-united-states-v-comprehensive-drug-testing-but-amending-
opinion-to-remove-challenged-section/.  In the new opinion, Judge Kozinski recharacterized 
the guidance procedures as a “safe harbor” for government searches.  CDT III, 2010 WL 
3529247 at *14.  Nonetheless, the concurrence implies that a failure to follow the guidance 
would result in a “significant” decrease in the odds of a district or magistrate judge's warrant 
being deemed reasonable.  See id. (“[H]eeding this guidance will significantly increase the 
likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage that they authorize will be 
deemed reasonable and lawful.”).  The holding, as revised, is now somewhat ambiguous.  
Read narrowly, the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision now stands primarily on the 
failure of the Government to comply with the Tamura procedures, which themselves 
preclude “plain view” as a justification for seizure.  Id. at *6.  What remains unclear is what 
specific set of circumstances trigger Tamura procedures.  Clearly, seizure of intermingled 
documents in the possession of a third party will be certain to trigger Tamura, since those 
were the circumstances of both Tamura and Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.  But the court 
implies that it might also be triggered in first-party instances, since it cites to United States v. 
Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004), which was such a case.  Id. at *6.  
Alternatively, Tamura may be triggered by the removal of intermingled documents to a 
government facility.  See CDT III, 2010 WL 3529247 at *5 (“No doubt in response to [the 
Tamura precedent], the government here did seek advance authorization for sorting and 
segregating the seized materials off-site.”).  However, whether or not this disincentivization 
of removal will solve the Fourth Amendment challenge posed by digital evidence seems 
unclear, and the decision may simply encourage the government to engage in on-site digital 
forensic investigations whenever possible in order to avoid triggering Tamura procedures. 
  
40 See, e.g., Recent Case, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 
989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (2010); John R. Emshwiller, 
Currents—Law Journal: Courts Wrestle with Searches When the Evidence Is Digital, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 24, 2009, at A17 (“A recent ruling by the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed this question, and the decision could reshape what government investigators can—
and can’t—do when searching digital devices for evidence of crime.”); Welcome to the 
Digital Fourth, SIMPLE JUSTICE, (Aug. 28, 2009), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2009/08/28/ 
welcome-the-digital-fourth.aspx; Ashby Jones, Beyond A-Rod and ManRam: Plain Talk on 
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Its holdings attempt to create a firewall between investigators and digital 
information not specified in the warrant.  By forcing investigators to waive 
plain view claims, it seeks to further ensure that evidence of crimes 
discovered during a digital search will only be admitted if the evidence was 
described with particularity in the warrant.  Further still, by requiring the 
search to be conducted by a technician sworn to secrecy, it creates an 
additional barrier to the use of plain view to justify seizures since 
information not particularized in the warrant never reaches investigators.  
Instead, the non-pertinent information (no matter how incriminating) is 
limited to the specialists, who must disregard it.  It also demands that 
magistrate judges be presented with search protocols designed to uncover 
“only” the information sought, although it is unclear how literally this 
holding is to be interpreted. 41
Judge Kozinski’s decision reflects a sharp skepticism towards the use 
of digital plain view, which may reflect a general concern that “plain view 
is killing the Fourth Amendment” in general.
 
42  The Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. holding represents a much more aggressive response to the 
Fourth Amendment implications of computer searches than the decisions 
from any other federal court and carries serious implications.43
 
the ‘Plain View Doctrine,’ WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2009, 12:40 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/28/beyond-a-rod-and-manram-plain-talk-on-the-plain-
view-doctrine/ (reprinting comments of Professor Peter Henning) (“While I suspect 
prosecutors can live with the other requirements the Ninth Circuit imposed, giving up the 
plain view doctrine is going to be a non-starter.  That requirement may well cause the 
government to take the case to the Supreme Court.”); Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Enacts 
Miranda-Like Code for Computer Search and Seizure, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Aug. 26, 
2009, 1:38pm), http://volokh.com/posts/1251308337.shtml. 
  Forcing 
government agents to waive plain view arguments may lead to serious 
crimes going unprosecuted.  The other procedures dictated by the holding 
41 The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision represents a fairly clear break with 
prior Ninth Circuit precedents.  Judge Callahan, writing in dissent, catalogued several.  CDT 
II, 579 F.3d 989, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887–88 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to impose heightened Fourth 
Amendment protections in computer search cases as a result of a computer’s ability to store 
large amounts of potentially intermingled information, and stating that such heightened 
protections must be “based on a principle that is not technology-specific”); United States v. 
Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding digital plain view when seizure of hardware 
was supported by a reasonable explanation); United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 837 (9th 
Cir. 2003)).  
42 See United States v. Lemus, 569 F.3d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying en banc 
appeal) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Plain view is killing the Fourth Amendment.  Because 
our plain-view case law is so favorable to the police, they have a strong incentive to 
maneuver into a position where they can find things in plain view, or close enough to lie 
about it.”). 
43 See infra Part IV.A. 
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have invited comparisons to the complex procedural requirements of United 
States v. Miranda,44 and have been enacted with little mention of 
practicality.45
III. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE AND SEARCHES 
  To help place this decision in context, a brief summary of 
plain view doctrine and the approaches to digital searches adopted by other 
courts follows. 
Plain view doctrine is a longstanding concept within search and 
seizure law.46  It is one of several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, 
which requires warrants in most searches and seizures.47  The exception 
permits warrantless seizure of evidence that is: (1) found during a prior 
justified intrusion; (2) in plain view; and (3) incriminating in a manner that 
is “immediately apparent.”48  It is “grounded on the proposition that once 
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s 
privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of 
title and possession but not privacy.”49
A. COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
  Since plain view is at the core of the 
Ninth Circuit’s concerns regarding digital searches, a brief review follows. 
One of the earliest cases clearly defining and justifying the plain view 
doctrine is Coolidge v. New Hampshire.50
 
44 Kerr, supra note 
  The case dealt with the seizure 
40. 
45 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 15–18, United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-10061, 05-15006, 05-55354) (providing 
a discussion of the difficulties of applying the case officer technician firewall). 
46 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1026, 1066 (1765) (Lord Camden) 
(“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
(good faith error); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consent); Hester v. United States 
265 U.S. 57 (1987) (open fields doctrine); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) 
(exigent circumstances); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk exception); Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967) (“hot pursuit” of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (imminent destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (automobile exception); see also THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 8–9, 75–114 (2009) (listing the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement and attributing their development as a response to the 
creation of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
48 See Howard E. Wallin, Plain View Revisited, 22 PACE L. REV. 307, 307 (2002) 
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971)). 
49 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). 
50 403 U.S. at 443.  The Court had previously decided several cases permitting police to 
lawfully seize articles of an “incriminating character” not specified in the warrant being 
executed.  Id. at 465 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., 
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of a car on the property of a murder suspect.51  The Court held that the 
“plain view” doctrine permits unwarranted seizures of clearly incriminating 
evidence under certain circumstances.52  The Court justified this principle 
by first noting that the warrant requirement serves two specific purposes: 
eliminating searches not based on probable cause and limiting searches 
such that the warrants do not resemble the colonial practice of issuing 
“general warrants.”53  It reasoned that permitting the seizure of objects in 
plain view does not violate the first objective, since the view is predicated 
on the exercise of a lawfully obtained search warrant based on probable 
cause.54  It then reasoned that the second objective was also satisfied 
because the initial intrusion was justified by a particularized warrant and 
plain view does not otherwise convert the search into a general warrant.55  
However, plain view searches could not be used “to extend a general 
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating 
at last emerges.”56
In Coolidge, the Court also adopted an “inadvertence” requirement, 
requiring that evidence seized under plain view be discovered accidentally 
rather than intentionally.
 
57  Justice Black criticized the inadvertence rule in 
his concurrence,58 arguing that the “reasonableness” of a search should be 
evaluated “under all the circumstances” rather than by affixing per se 
rules.59  Justice Black’s position on the inadvertence requirement would 
ultimately be adopted by the Court in California v. Horton.60  Noting that 
the discussion of “inadvertence” was limited to the plurality opinion, the 
Court declined to apply it to the present case.61
 
concurring in result)); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart 
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 
498 (1925).  Coolidge is noteworthy for first establishing “plain view” as a distinct legal 
doctrine.  403 U.S. at 443. 
  Its two primary criticisms 
51 Id. at 445. 
52 Id. at 465. 
53 Id. at 467; see also WILLIAM CUDDIHY, FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 602–1791, at 569–74 (2009). 
54 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. 
55 Id. at 467. 
56 Id. at 466. 
57 Id. at 469. 
58 Id. at 506–07 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). 
59 Id. at 509–10. 
60 496 U.S. 128 (1990).  The case stemmed from the execution of a search warrant based 
on probable cause of robbery and only authorizing a search of the defendant’s house for the 
proceeds of that robbery.  Instead the searching officer discovered weapons in plain view, 
which were seized as evidence.  Id. at 131. 
61 Id. at 136–37. 
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were: (1) that objective standards were preferable to standards that “depend 
on the subjective state of mind of the officer” and, (2) because the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment was sufficient to protect 
against the danger of general warrants, the additional protection of an 
inadvertence requirement was unnecessary.62
B. ARIZONA V. HICKS 
 
In Arizona v. Hicks the Supreme Court clarified plain view doctrine by 
requiring probable cause for plain view evidence to be seized.63  In that 
case, officers entered an apartment without a warrant in response to a shot 
fired from that apartment into the one below.64  Upon entering the 
apartment, they discovered an expensive stereo component that, given the 
seemingly “squalid” condition of the apartment as a whole, fell under 
immediate suspicion of being stolen.65  An officer moved the stereo 
component in order to view the serial number, which was used to confirm 
that it was, in fact, stolen.66
The Court held that the moving of the stereo component constituted an 
unreasonable search.
 
67  Even though the invasion of privacy was simply 
moving a stereo component “a few inches,” the Court drew a bright line.68  
Since the gun that the officers were authorized to search for could not have 
been located in the area underneath the stereo component, the warrantless 
search of the stereo was unreasonable.69
 
62 Id. at 138–40. 
  Even though the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the stereo was stolen, he lacked 
probable cause and so was prohibited from “seizing” the turntable in order 
63 480 U.S. 321 (1987).  The requirement of probable cause has been explicitly left 
unresolved in cases such as Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 n.7 (1983) (plurality).  See 
also Wallin, supra note 48, at 311–15 (discussing how the ambiguity of pre-Hicks caselaw 
led to some lower courts adopting standards lower than probable cause). 
64 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 323–34. 
67 Id. at 328. 
68 Id. at 325. 
69 Id. at 325–26.  The ruling also corrected an interpretation of Coolidge put forward by 
the Arizona Court of Appeals.  State v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).  The 
Arizona court had held in Hicks that the search was unreasonable because the turntable was 
unrelated to the shooting that justified the warrantless entry into the apartment.  This implied 
that even if the serial number had been on the top of the turntable and plainly visible, the 
search would have been unreasonable.  The Supreme Court directly rejected this 
interpretation.  Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325. 
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to view its serial number.70  Since the officer only had a “reasonable 
suspicion” that the stereo component was stolen, the Court held that 
probable cause was lacking and an additional warrant would have been 
required.71
C. DIGITAL PLAIN VIEW
 
72
The Supreme Court’s treatment of plain view and plain view 
analogues seems to be driven by a desire to prevent “fishing expeditions” 
and dragnets, but to also create objective working rules for defining what a 
“fishing expedition” is, rather than the simpler—but rightfully abandoned—
approach of asking whether or not the officer subjectively believed that he 
was engaged in a fishing expedition.  In physical cases, these fishing 
expeditions can be detected by a sort of common sense reasoning.  An 
officer who detects contraband through “plain feel” while conducting a 
legitimate Terry search is thus judged to be conducting a legitimate 
search,
 
73 while an offer who boards a bus and squeezes soft-shell luggage 
until contraband is discovered is not.74
One of the central problems raised by digital plain view is that this 
common sense reasoning becomes more difficult to apply in a digital 
context.  Digital searches take place in an abstract space and the intentions 
of officers conducting such a search can be difficult to objectively 
determine, except in the most blatant cases.  In Hicks, the shifting of the 
stereo equipment, even though it was a minor act by the officer, clearly 
raised a flag for the Court, since it was clear that the act was unrelated to 
searching for a gun.  By contrast, the actions of officers searching a 
computer might not always be as easily reviewed by the courts for blatant 
Fourth Amendment violations.  This dynamic is concerning, since it makes 
policing the execution of digital search warrants more difficult at the same 
time as those warrants offer improved opportunities for fishing expeditions. 
  The judge is supposed to look at the 
surrounding context of the officer’s actions and judge its reasonableness. 
 
70 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 322, 326–27 (noting that the exceptions are for circumstances 
where the seizure is “minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only 
practicable means of detecting certain types of crime”). 
71 Id. at 322, 326. 
72 This Comment will use the term “digital plain view” to refer to any evidence 
encountered while searching digital media that, while not responsive to the warrant 
permitting the search, is nonetheless seizable in a manner similar to evidence encountered in 
traditional plain view situations such as Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
73 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 370–71 (1993). 
74 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000). 
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But, in holding that the use of plain view in digital searches is per se 
unconstitutional, the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision is 
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent.  Allowing the use of 
digital evidence discovered in plain view satisfies the first two purposes of 
the warrant requirement, as defined in Coolidge.  First, a digital plain view 
claim does not waive the probable cause requirement any more than a 
conventional plain view claim does.75  Indeed, maintaining the probable 
cause requirement is essential to the approach advocated in this Comment, 
since it provides a critical point of reference for judges seeking to 
objectively assess the reasonableness of search warrants.76  Second, a 
properly particularized search warrant does not constitute a “general 
warrant.”  Typically, courts have not found that searches limited to a 
particular place, in pursuit of a particular crime, and seeking sufficiently 
particularized items constitute general warrants.77
IV. SEARCHES OF DIGITAL DATABASES 
  Digital plain view, 
despite the dangers, can be made to work if the courts are provided a new 
way of objectively assessing whether the search being conducted is 
reasonable, or simply an opportunistic fishing expedition. 
No court has attempted as detailed an approach to regulating digital 
searches as the Ninth Circuit.  The district courts have generally been free 
to develop their own approaches, although they have generally been fairly 
permissive of digital searches.  Digital search problems have also attracted 
the attention of many legal scholars whose proposals and solutions have 
found their way into the reasoning of some courts.  This section surveys 
these approaches. 
 
75 Cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326 (1987). 
76 See infra Part V. 
77 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (“[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not 
that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s 
belongings . . . . [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a particular 
description of the things to be seized.”); United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]uthorization to search for ‘evidence of a crime,’ that is to say, any 
crime, is so broad as to constitute a general warrant.”) (quoting United States v. George, 975 
F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 
(1967) (noting that the general warrants permitted searches under “indiscriminate, general 
authority” and that the Fourth Amendment ended general searches by requiring that the 
warrant “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 
1984) (holding that a warrant whose terms authorized seizure of documents “pertaining to a 
specific fraudulent transaction and a specific piece of real estate” did not constitute a general 
warrant). 
1600 VINCENT ANGERMEIER [Vol. 100 
A. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
Both circuit and district courts have addressed the question of the 
application of plain view to digital database searches.  While there has been 
some variation, most have permitted digital searches using plain view when 
the data was incriminating and discovered while executing a particularized 
warrant based on probable cause. 
1. United States v. Carey: The File-Based Approach 
In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a case in which 
the police executed a search warrant for evidence of the sale and possession 
of cocaine by the defendant.78  Upon discovering computers on the 
premises, the officers seized them and obtained an additional search warrant 
to search the hard drives for “names, telephones, ledger receipts, addresses, 
and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of 
controlled substances.”79  The police technician first attempted to search for 
key words related to drug sales in “text-based” files.80  When that failed, he 
“explore[d]” the computer until he discovered a particular image file, which 
he proceeded to open.81  It contained child pornography.  Rather than 
obtaining a warrant expanding the scope of the search, the officer continued 
opening files in that directory.82  Many of those files contained additional 
images of child pornography and were labeled with sexually suggestive 
titles.83
The court held that the search of image files beyond the first file was 
unreasonable.
 
84  It noted that after opening the first file, the officer, by his 
own admission, had probable cause to believe that the remaining files in the 
directory also contained child pornography rather than evidence of drug 
distribution.85  Citing Tamura, it held that in computer searches, officers 
must conduct an “intermediate step” and attempt to sort the digital files 
such that intermingled non-pertinent files are removed prior to the search 
beginning in earnest.86  It also directed that magistrates “should” require the 
officers to specify which types of files are sought.87
 
78 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1271. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1271 & n.3. 
84 Id. at 1276–77. 
85 Id. at 1274. 
86 Id. at 1275 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
87 Id. 
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This file-based approach to regulating digital searches has not found 
much success as courts have become more aware of the ease with which it 
can be circumvented.88  The Tenth Circuit has already begun to walk away 
from the Carey holding, noting in subsequent cases that it was a “limited” 
and “fact-intense” holding89 that “simply stands for the proposition that law 
enforcement may not expand the scope of a search beyond its original 
jurisdiction.”90  Although the Tenth Circuit seems to be in the process of 
marginalizing Carey, it remains influential in some circuit court decisions.91
2. United States v. Mann: The Ambiguous Scrutiny Approach 
 
However, the acceptance is far from universal. 
Subsequent to the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision, the 
Seventh Circuit has approved the use of digital plain view.92  That case, 
United States v. Mann, concerned the warranted seizure and search of a 
hard drive that the police believed contained evidence related to the 
defendant’s covert videotaping of a high school locker room.93  Upon 
searching the hard drive using specialized software, the police discovered 
“many, many images of child pornography” as well as videos of the locker 
room.94
 
88 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
Carey seems to establish an inadvertence requirement which is difficult to reconcile with the 
holding of Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)). 
  The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the 
89 United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009). 
90 United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006). 
91 See infra note 111. 
92 United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing CDT II, 579 F.3d 989 
(9th Cir. 2009)).  Although the Mann decision was released after Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., it only contains one passing reference to CDT II.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit had 
previously addressed the question of plain view in dicta.  United States v. Raney, 342 F.3d 
551, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding search on grounds that the data seized was 
particularized in the warrant, but alternatively permitted under plain view). 
93 Mann, 592 F.3d at 780. 
94 Id. at 781.  Some of the child pornography had been discovered using a “hashing” 
program, an automated program that can detect the presence of a particular file on a 
computer hard drive if the exact digital contents of that file are already known to the 
investigators.  See Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the 
Particularity Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2007); see also United States v. 
Gabel, No. 10-60168, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107131, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2010) 
(describing the national database of “child notable” image files, which investigators use to 
program the automated hashing programs).  The court ultimately suppressed the files 
discovered by the hashing program, because it targeted known child pornography files, even 
though the search was for files with unknown digital contents.  Mann, 592 F.3d, at 784–85.  
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. en banc decision also expressed concern, in dicta, 
about the use of hashing programs.  CDT II, 579 F.3d at 999.  However, hashing programs 
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police had exceeded the scope of their warrant and had effectively 
conducted a prohibited general search.95
The court upheld the search, noting that the software used by the 
officer served primarily to collect image files, including disguised files, and 
display them.
 
96  The court noted that the warrant directed the police to 
search “places likely to contain ‘images of women in locker rooms and 
other private places,’” and that such an image file could be hidden virtually 
anywhere within the computer.97  Since the program was used in a 
“systematic” way to search the computer, the discovery and seizure of child 
pornography was reasonable.98  The court specifically declined to adopt the 
holding of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., instead adopting Judge 
Callahan’s criticism that the abolition of digital plain view was an “efficient 
but overbroad approach.”99  The court counseled that magistrates “exercise 
caution to ensure” that digital search warrants meet the particularity 
requirement and are narrowly tailored.100  It is difficult to know what this 
“narrowly tailored” requirement consists of, since the court approvingly 
cited United States v. Gray.101
 
raise interesting questions in light of Supreme Court precedents, such as United States v. 
Jacobsen, in which the Court upheld a government chemical test for the presence of cocaine 
in a pile of white powder that fell out of an in-transit delivery package.  466 U.S. 109 (1984).  
The warrantless search was upheld because it could disclose no “private facts,” only the 
presence of cocaine.  Id. at 123 (“A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a 
particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”).  
What limits therefore should be placed on hashing programs, even if they are undeniably 
used to conduct warrantless fishing expeditions?  See United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 
1045, 1048 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that using hashing software to “vacuum[] vast 
quantities of [internet] data indiscriminately” may result in a Fourth Amendment violation, 
but upholding its use to detect child pornography shared using peer-to-peer software); United 
States v. Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (invalidating hash program 
search on grounds that the search was directed towards child pornography, but the officers 
lacked a warrant and had only been given consent by owner to search for evidence of “illegal 
credit card use”).  For a broader discussion of the “private facts” model discussed in 
Jacobsen, see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
503, 512 (2007); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth 
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 387–90 (2002) (criticizing the 
Jacobsen decision’s rationale). 
  In that case, digital plain view was held to 
justify the discovery of child pornography during a file-by-file search of a 
computer due to the fact that the search was done systematically and 
95 Mann, 592 F.3d at 782. 
96 Id. at 785–86.  
97 Id. at 782. 
98 Id. at 786. 
99 Id. at 785. 
100 Id. at 786. 
101 Id. at 784. 
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regardless of file name.102  Thus, the court’s directive to narrowly tailor 
searches clearly still allows law enforcement to conduct searches of entire 
hard drives, while adopting Carey-like requirement of a systematic search. 
3. United States v. Williams: The Status Quo Approach 
The facts of United States v. Williams resembled those of Mann, 
although Williams stemmed from an investigation into threatening e-mails 
sent to a church rather than voyeurism.103  The police obtained a broad 
warrant, authorizing the seizure of “[a]ny and all computer systems and 
digital storage media, videotapes, videotape recorders, documents, 
photographs, and Instrumentalities indicat[ive] of [criminal e-mail 
harassment].”104  Searches of these media uncovered child pornography, 
some of it placed in files mislabeled “Virus Shield Quaranteed [sic] Files, 
Destroy.”105 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the application of plain view, applying a 
more permissive approach to digital searches than the Seventh Circuit.  In a 
sort of preamble, the court announced its expectation that digital searches 
and seizures would soon develop a “set of rules . . . that attempts to achieve 
the same purpose [as the rules for physical searches] in a very different 
factual context.”106  However, the court rejected the specific argument 
presented, which was that the immense amount of data stored on computers 
created a heightened expectation of privacy, requiring specialized 
requirements for searches under the Fourth Amendment.107  The court 
refused to treat digital databases in a manner different than a file cabinet 
containing a large number of documents.108   
Although the court recognized the “grave dangers inherent in 
executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s 
papers,”109 it noted that these concerns simply “counsel[] care and respect 
for privacy when executing a warrant” and do not prevent lawful searches 
 
102 Id. (citing United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding 
the opening of a file labeled “tiny teen” by an officer searching for evidence of computer 
hacking because officer opened the file only after opening every file listed previous to it in 
the file directory)). 
103 592 F.3d 511, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2010).  The threats to the church made mention of a 
desire to molest young boys who attended the church.  Id. 
104 Id. at 515. 
105 Id. at 516. 
106 Id. at 515. 
107 Id. at 518. 
108 Id. at 523. 
109 Id. (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976)). 
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of computer files.110  Because the court accepted the logic that files may be 
mislabeled, as the files were in this case, the file-by-file search conducted 
met the requirements of plain view once the “immediately apparent” child 
pornography came into view.111  Since the search complied with the basic 
requirements for searches of physical documents, the court ultimately 
upheld the search.112  Despite being decided several months after 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the decision did not mention the case, 
although it did cite to a prior Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. 
Giberson, which similarly held that for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, digital storage media are not significantly different than other 
closed containers.113
B. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS 
 
The district courts have been addressing issues raised by plain view 
digital searches for over a decade.114  As one might expect, they have 
adopted a range of approaches.  For example, in United States v. Fumo, a 
case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court adopted a pro-search 
approach to digital records, noting that “because of the nature of computer 
files, the government may legally open and briefly examine the nature of 
each file when searching a computer pursuant to a valid warrant.”115
Like the Fourth Circuit, the district courts have generally rejected the 
position that, by their nature, digital records must be protected in a different 
 
 
110 Id. at 523–24. 
111 Id. at 522–23. 
112 Id. at 524.  
113 Id. (citing United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008)).  The court cited 
Giberson in support of its treatment of computers as a container.  Id. 
114 See generally United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United 
States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690 (D. Me. Sep. 29, 2009); United 
States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Crespo-Rios, 623 F. 
Supp. 2d 198 (D.P.R. 2009); United States v. Mann, No. 2:07-CR-197, 2008 WL 1701743, 
(N.D. Ind. April 8, 2008); United States v. Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 
2008); United States v. Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2008); United States v. Sage, 
Crim. Act. No. 07-00006-01-CR-W-SOW, 2007 LEXIS 99110 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2007); 
United States v. Kearns, No. 1:05-CR-146-WSD-JMF, 2006 WL 2668544 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 
21, 2006); United States v. Kaechele, 466 F. Supp. 2d 868 (E.D. Mich. 2006); United States 
v. Welch, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Kan. 2005); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 
(C.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004); In re 
Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961–62 (N.D. Ill. 2004); United States v. 
Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002); United States v. Gray, 78 F. 
Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998).  
115 Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
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manner than physical records.116  The decisions tend to reject arguments 
claiming overbroad searches117 or unparticularized warrants.118  While at 
least one court has experimented with requiring the government to provide 
search protocols,119 only a few cases have analyzed the case using the 
Carey file-based framework120 and many have distinguished or rejected 
it.121





116 See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2007) (“At bottom . . . there is neither a heightened nor a reduced level of 
protection for information stored on computers, as there is no justification for favoring those 
who are capable of storing their records on computer over those who keep hard copies of 
their records.”); accord Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 584; Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
  The case is of particular note as it was decided by Judge 
Kozinski, sitting by designation as a district court judge, five years prior to 
authoring the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision.  The case, like 
many digital search cases, involved a suppression motion filed by a 
defendant in a child pornography possession case.  The suppression motion 
argued, in part, that the search warrant granted to the police for digital 
storage media was overbroad because it failed to define a search 
methodology based on file names or types.  Judge Kozinski rejected this 
argument, noting that “images can be hidden in all manner of files, even 
117 See United States v. Jack, No. CR.S-07-0266 FCD, 2009 WL 453051, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (providing a list of district and circuit court cases rejecting or 
discounting these overbreadth arguments).  But see Richardson, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 964 
(suppressing image files in “plain view” during a consented to search when the search would 
only require searching text or internet-based files). 
118 See Sage, 2007 LEXIS 99110 at *18; Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690 at *5.  But see Mink 
v. Knox, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14684 (10th Cir. July 19, 2010) (rejecting search warrant 
on particularity grounds, since the warrant failed to specify the crime that investigators were 
to search the computer for evidence of). 
119 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (requiring “as a 
practical matter” that the Government provide magistrates with search protocols when 
searching intermingled digital documents in order to satisfy the particularity requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL 
670930, *4 (D. Utah Apr. 13, 2001) (holding that methods or criteria by which a search of 
computer files would be conducted “should have been presented to [a] . . . magistrate before 
the issuance of the warrants or to support the issuance of a second, more specific warrant 
once intermingled documents were discovered”). 
120 See Mann v. United States, 592 F.3d 779, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2010); Richardson, 583 F. 
Supp. 2d at 716. 
121 United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 948 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Jack, 2009 WL 
453051, at *4; United States v. Kearns, No. 1:05-CR-146-WSD-JMF, 2006 WL 2668544, at 
*7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006); United States v. Welch, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D. Kan. 
2005); Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
122 332 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
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word processing documents and spreadsheets.  Criminals will do all they 
can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient of changing the 
names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual 
observer.”123  Ultimately, the search was upheld.124
The district courts have been weighing the reasonableness of digital 
plain view for some time, experimenting with different methods for 
evaluating the reasonableness of search warrant applications based on their 
knowledge of existing technology and circuit court methods.  Although 
their results have produced variation, their collective experience indicates 
that they could cope with a more flexible approach to reviewing digital 
search applications than the one advocated in Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc. 
 
C. SCHOLARLY WRITING 
Digital searches have attracted the attention of legal scholars for well 
over a decade.  Published articles have advocated a variety of positions, 
from abolition of plain view to unfettered continuation.125
 
123 Id. at 1090. 
  The articles have 
124 Id.  Judge Kozinski’s decision in United States v. Hill is very difficult to reconcile 
with his stance in Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.  One difference (among others) was 
that Hill concerned the privacy of a child pornography possessor, while Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc. threatened the privacy rights of professional baseball players, a 
considerably less despised group.  At least one commentator has noted the danger posed by 
the fact most digital search cases result from child pornography prosecutions.  RayMing 
Chang, Note, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evidence, 12 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 61 (2007).  In theory, this may lead courts to adopt 
more permissive search standards than they would otherwise.  Id.  This is roughly analogous 
to the weakening of the Fourth Amendment caused by the War on Drugs, due to the relative 
unpopularity of the defendants in those cases.  See Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot 
Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment Survive the Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. 
REV. 631 (2004). 
125 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and 
Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193 (2005) (arguing that computers are 
not sufficiently different from conventional document containers to require new protocols); 
Jekot, supra note 94 (exploring alternatives, but not advocating any particular one); Orin 
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005) (arguing for 
abolition of digital plain view on pragmatic grounds); Raphael Winick, Searches and 
Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994) (arguing for 
search restrictions based on file formats); Chang, supra note 124 (arguing for abolition of 
plain view in digital searches); David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the 
Execution of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
841 (2005) (arguing that traditional document search rules should apply to digital searches); 
Recent Case, supra note 40 (arguing that plain view should be applicable to digital 
documents, but only when the particular file containing the incriminating data was 
responsive to the warrant).  Although digital searches have attracted significant scholarly 
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had some influence on the courts.  In its Carey decision, the Tenth Circuit 
cited a Harvard Journal of Law & Technology article by Professor Raphael 
Winick in support of its file-format based search parameter.126  Professor 
Winick recommended that the Tamura procedure be extended into digital 
searches in order to preserve the particularity requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.127  The article argued that analogizing computers to physical 
“containers” and applying “container” precedents was inappropriate to 
address the Fourth Amendment concerns raised by digital searches.128  
Finally, the article suggested that the government must face a heavy burden 
in demonstrating probable cause of deception when seeking to conduct a 
search that does not rely on file names and formats.129
Although Professor Winick’s article did not specifically address plain 
view in the context of digital searches, later articles called for its abolition.  
Many of them also strongly disagreed with Carey and Professor Winick.
 
130  
Those advocating for the abolition of the plain view doctrine based their 
arguments on several grounds.  One argument is that digital plain view, due 
to its incentivizing of invasive and aimless searches, constitutes a de facto 
authorization of constitutionally impermissible “general warrants.”131  This 
school of thought regards computers as a special and unique situation, 
comparable to a “tape recorder . . . that’s recording our every thought and 
every word.”132
Professor Orin Kerr has also argued for the abolition of plain view in 




attention, this Comment is the first to advocate a flexible process of search warrant 
negotiations centered around creating a balance between the privacy costs of the search and 
the societal interests in punishing a particular crime.  See infra Part V. 
  
He argues that abolishing plain view is not only the least complicated 
approach to rethinking the plain view doctrine, it is also the most 
126 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Winick, supra 
note 125). 
127 Winick, supra note 125, at 108–09 (“A vague allegation that the nature of computer 
storage somehow requires a full text review of all files in all situations should not be 
permitted to eviscerate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.”). 
128 Id. at 110. 
129 Id. at 108. 
130 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 124, at 50 (calling the Carey format-based approach to 
warrant restriction “illusory”); Ziff, supra note 125, at 853 (“The Carey-Winick approach 
fails to apply the plain view doctrine to searches of computer files and incorrectly relies on 
the subjective intent of the searching officer to determine the constitutional limits on the 
scope of a computer search.”). 
131 Chang, supra note 124, at 66. 
132 Id. at 67 (internal quotes omitted). 
133 Kerr, supra note 125, at 534. 
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balanced.134  In the process of removing their ability to claim plain view 
justifications, it frees law enforcement officers to conduct computer 
searches in whatever manner they find to be the most efficient way to 
discover the files particularized in the warrant.135  Professor Kerr does 
however admit that this is an “imperfect” approach.136
Other articles advocate for continued application of plain view to 
digital searches.  An excellent student note by J.S. Ziff calls for an alternate 
approach to that recommended by the Carey-Winick approach.
 
137  Ziff 
argues that the existing limitations of plain view doctrine are sufficient to 
maintain Fourth Amendment rights in a digital age.  Those rights, as 
defined in Horton are: (1) that the officer lawfully be in a position from 
which to view the object seized in plain view, (2) that the object’s 
incriminating character be immediately apparent, and (3) that the officer 
have a lawful right of access to the object itself.138  Of these requirements, 
Ziff believes the “immediately apparent” requirement is especially 
restrictive, since it requires that the government prove it had probable cause 
to believe that the evidence found in plain view was contraband or evidence 
of a crime.139
Thus, the scholarly approaches seem to gravitate toward extremes, 
calling either for the outright abolition of digital plain view or its 
unmodified preservation.  To some degree, this is because there is no 
obvious middle ground; either immediately incriminating evidence not 
described in a search warrant is admissible, or it is not.  However, this 
failure to create a middle ground results in a failure to produce an optimal 
approach to balancing privacy with the social need for effective criminal 
investigations.  This Comment argues that such a middle ground exists, as 
described below. 
  For these reasons, Ziff concludes that the plain view doctrine 
can be fairly applied to digital searches. 
V. REBALANCING COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ultimately is an overreaction 
sparked by the concern that the government has found a major loophole 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 583–84. 
136 Id. 
137 Ziff, supra note 125; see also Clancy, supra note 125, at 195 (arguing that digital 
media should be treated in the same manner as physical containers, such as filing cabinets). 
138 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990). 
139 Ziff, supra note 125, at 866. 
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with respect to digital plain view.140  The en banc panel was concerned that 
by combining the plain view doctrine with the seemingly arbitrary nature of 
a digital search, the government will be able to circumvent the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on general searches.141  However, in creating a 
judicially-imposed process applicable to all “normal[]” digital search cases, 
regardless of individual circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has constructed an 
inefficient solution to a problem that demands a careful approach.142  
Further, by overextending Fourth Amendment protections in this area, the 
Ninth Circuit risks providing itself, or other courts, with an excuse for not 
extending them far enough in more deserving locations.143
Rather than affixing per se rules, the most adaptable and efficient 
approach to protecting Fourth Amendment rights in an era of digital 
searches is to focus, on a case-by-case basis, on the reasonableness of the 
search.
 
144  Magistrate judges should deny search warrants which will cause 
unreasonable harm to legitimate privacy interests, in light of the severity of 
the crime being investigated and the strength of the probable cause shown.  
In turn, the government can re-apply and offer search procedures calculated 
to decrease the privacy costs of their search (as determined by the 
magistrate).  This will help ensure that the social harm caused by 
government intrusions can be minimized, while allowing the government to 
narrowly tailor its searches in a manner that minimizes inefficiency.145
 
140 See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The sequence of events supports the 
suspicion that representations in the warrant about the necessity for broad authority to seize 
materials were designed to give the government access to the full list of professional baseball 
players and their confidential drug testing records.”). 
  
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1000.  This Comment does not argue that the en banc decision to dismiss the 
Government’s appeal of the “Mahan Order” as untimely was incorrect.  Nor does it take 
issue with the fifth holding of the case, related to return of documents, which seems to reflect 
the existing interpretation of Fed R. Crim. Pro. 41(g) and addresses concerns regarding 
government stockpiling of private information.  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 166–67 (2004). 
143 Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 116–17 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
absolutist approach to protecting houses under the Fourth Amendment has been used as a 
justification for denial of Fourth Amendment protections in other contexts). 
144 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509–10 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) 
(“The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its 
own facts.”); see also United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (“As always under 
the Fourth Amendment, the standard is reasonableness.”). 
145 Alexander A. Reinert notes that often the Court often views privacy costs as those 
borne by the individual, even though there is a general “collective value” in limiting the 
number and intrusiveness of government searches.  Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) 
and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 104 ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1464–65 (2010).  This 
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Furthermore, it is important to remember that, if digital searches are 
properly monitored and subjected to scrutiny during trial, the digital plain 
view approach is actually of limited use to the government.  This makes the 
development of extraordinary procedures to limit its abuse unnecessary. 
A. REASONABLE DIGITAL SEARCHES 
In order to obtain a search warrant, the government must demonstrate 
probable cause to justify their search.146  Probable cause is an ambiguous 
phrase, and, historically, the Supreme Court’s treatment of it has been 
somewhat inconsistent.  The Court has offered different explanations of 
what constitutes probable cause throughout its history.147  It remains unclear 
whether or not probable cause even means that a certain suspicion must be 
more likely than not to be valid.148  Professor Craig Lerner, among others, 
has raised the question of whether probable cause is, in fact, not a fixed 
probability, but is rather variable, depending on the overall 
“reasonableness” of a particular search requested by the government.149
 
Comment similarly refers to such costs as “social costs” rather than purely individual ones, 
although individual costs can typically be calculated in a more direct and intuitive manner 
than broader social costs.  
  
Professor Lerner explains that “reasonableness” can be explained in a 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (stating 
that “the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the 
term ‘probable cause’”). 
147 Compare United States v. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(“[Probable cause] imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”), 
with United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924) (Taft, C.J.) (defining probable cause 
as a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt”), and United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160, 
175 (1949) (noting that probable cause requires “less than evidence which would justify . . . 
conviction” but “more than mere suspicion”), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983).  See generally Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 951, 979–90 (2003) (providing a history of the Supreme Court’s attempts to define 
probable cause). 
148 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e) (4th ed. 2004) (reviewing a 
trio of modern Supreme Court cases and concluding that they do not expressly answer the 
question of whether probable cause means more-probable-than-not); see also Lerner, supra 
note 147, at 996 (“[T]he Court’s statement that probable cause is more than a suspicion and 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt places it somewhere between .01% and 90%, which, 
when all is said and done, is not all that helpful.”). 
149 Lerner, supra note 147, at 951 (“The reality experienced by American citizens today 
is that they are searched and seized on a regular basis, and for the vast majority of these 
searches (e.g., airport searches, street stops, DUI checkpoints, urine testing of government 
employees), the constitutionality seems to turn not on probable cause, but on the 
reasonableness of the search, factoring in the degree of the intrusion and the gravity of the 
investigated offense.”); see also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A 
Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 474 (1984). 
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search and seizure context using a modified version of the Hand Formula—
a tool famous for estimating “reasonableness” in the context of 
negligence.150
The Hand Formula, as displayed below, seeks to optimize the balance 




B < P x L 
 
Negligence can be inferred when the costs of taking action to prevent 
an accident (B) are less than the product of the costs of the harm caused by 
the accident (L) and the probability of the accident occurring (P). 
Similarly, Professor Lerner creates a version modified for use in 
evaluating the reasonableness of searches under the Fourth Amendment:152
C < V x P 
 
Here, a search is reasonable if the costs of the privacy invasion (C) are 
less than the product of the social benefit of obtaining evidence of a 
particular crime (V) and the probability of such evidence being found in a 
particular place (P).153
[A]ssume that there is a twenty percent chance that police will uncover evidence of 
tax fraud among a suspect’s personal papers in his home.  The social benefit of a 
conviction is $100,000, and the privacy intrusion associated with a search of one’s 
personal papers is $50,000.  The expected benefit or value of a search would be 
$20,000 ($100,000 x .2), which is less than the expected cost of $40,000 ($50,000 x 
.8).  Thus, the search would be unreasonable in these circumstances.
  Professor Lerner provides an example of how this 
might work: 
154
Admittedly, assigning specific values to the variables is somewhat 




150 Lerner, supra note 
  This is a simple 
reality of many multi-factor balancing tests.  The value of this approach is 
147, at 1019–20 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)). 
151 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (5th ed. 1998). 
152 Lerner, supra note 147, at 1019–20.  This formula is hereinafter referred to as the 
“Lerner Formula.” 
153 Id.  Professor Lerner presents an additional formula: P x V > (1-P) x C, in an attempt 
to incorporate Supreme Court holdings stating that no invasion of privacy occurs when the 
government seizes contraband.  See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).  
He further modifies the formula to incorporate a “privacy multiplier” called m to reflect the 
fact that the harm caused by a search may vary depending on context.  This produces the 
formula: P x V > (1-P) x (C x m).  For the sake of simplicity, this Comment focuses on the 
first iteration of the formula. 
154 Lerner, supra note 147, at 1020. 
155 Id. 
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primarily heuristic, and its role is not to ensure perfect cost-benefit analysis 
of search warrant applications, but to ensure that magistrate judges consider 
both the costs of invasions of privacy and the social costs of undeterred 
crime when determining whether or not a search is reasonable.  
Furthermore, by having a simple and understandable framework, they can 
more easily coordinate their efforts with other magistrates and can more 
easily incorporate guidance from their appellate courts.156
Although this approach has faced criticism,
 
157 this balancing of 
privacy and social interests can be found in existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.158  For instance, in Winston v. Lee, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a restraining order brought by an armed robbery suspect to 
prevent the Commonwealth of Virginia from removing a bullet from the 
deep muscle tissue of his chest.159  The police believed the bullet would 
prove that the man had been shot while attempting to rob a store.160
 
156 See Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search 
Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 477 (2007) 
(arguing for a quantitative “economically-informed” approach to assessing the reasonable 
expectations of privacy regarding novel technologies instead of the more indeterminate 
“moral” approach to privacy).  Cf. Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 
(1978) (assessing the value of privacy in the context of torts in commercial and personal 
contexts). 
  The 
operation to remove the bullet would require the use of a general anesthetic 
157 See LAFAVE, supra note 148, at § 3.2(a) (“The problem with the balancing 
approach . . . is that it converts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot.  The 
varieties of police behavior and of the occasions that call it forth are so innumerable that 
their reflection in a general sliding scale approach could only produce more slide than 
scale.”); Kit Kinports, Commentary: Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 
6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 655 (2009) (disputing Professor Lerner’s interpretation of case 
law). 
158 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting) (“[I]f we 
are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me 
they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.”); see also Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“[I]n determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (“Determining 
whether an expectation of privacy is “legitimate” or “reasonable” necessarily entails a 
balancing of interests.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 21–22 (1968) (applying a balancing 
test to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s “pat-down” search); Camara v. Municipal 
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (“Unfortunately, there can be no ready 
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails.”).  But see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 
(1979) (rejecting the notion that privacy and governmental interests must be balanced on a 
case-by-case basis). 
159 470 U.S. 753, 757 (1985). 
160 Id. at 755–56.  The suspect claimed that he had been shot while being mugged.  Id. at 
756. 
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and could have taken anywhere between twenty minutes and two-and-a-half 
hours to complete.161  As with any surgery, the procedure carried risks of 
complications, infection, or over-anesthetization.162
The Court held that the reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath 
the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in “which the individual’s 
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in 
conducting the procedure.”
 
163  The Court found that the surgical procedure, 
although justified by probable cause, constituted an extreme intrusion into 
the bodily integrity and personal privacy of the suspect.164  It noted that 
such a serious intrusion easily outbalanced the Commonwealth’s need to 
retrieve the bullet, since other evidence could be used to establish the 
connection between the suspect and the robbery (such as identification by 
the storekeeper who shot him, and the fact that the suspect was found eight 
blocks away from the store only twenty minutes after the robbery.)165  The 
Court contrasted the circumstances of compelled surgery against the 
security of “houses, papers, and effects.”166
Winston clearly demonstrates a process of balancing in reviewing 
police actions for compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  The case would 
have clearly been resolved differently if the bullet had been lodged in the 
defendant’s shoe instead of his chest.  The Court hints that the case may 
have been decided in a different manner if the bullet had been essential to 
the case, rather than relatively disposable.  The case also shows, not only 
that the amount of probable cause necessary to justify warrants varies 
depending on the circumstances, but that sometimes even a high degree of 
probable cause cannot justify an unnecessary search with high privacy 
costs.  Winston reflects an effective illustration of why flexibility, rather 
than per se rules, can sometimes be the only way to maintain Fourth 
Amendment protections in novel situations, such as digital searches. 
 
 
161 Id. at 764. 
162 Id.  In its earlier decision, the court of appeals deemed these risks “minimal”.  Id. at 
764 n.7.  The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the actual risks of harm were 
“apparently not severe” but were at least “a subject of considerable dispute” and 
“uncertain[].”  Id. at 766. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 765. 
165 Id. at 756, 765 (noting that the suspect was identified by the storekeeper who had shot 
him, and the suspect had been found shot eight blocks away from the store only twenty 
minutes after the storekeeper shot the man robbing him). 
166 Id. at 759 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
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B. APPLYING THE LERNER FORMULA TO DIGITAL SEARCHES 
The Lerner Formula presents an adaptable and practical approach for 
reconciling the need for digital searches with the Fourth Amendment and 
rising expectations of privacy in digital storage media.  The privacy costs of 
a file-by-file digital search vary by computer, but it can generally be 
assumed to be fairly high.  The privacy costs of searching a computer used 
almost exclusively for criminal purposes are probably low, because the files 
particularized in the warrant are intermingled with a relatively small 
number of non-particularized files.  However, most computers targeted for 
search are personal computers.167  Personal computers play an increasingly 
central role in modern life and they often contain correspondence, personal 
records, medical information, and other forms of private information.168  A 
file-by-file search of these records would carry serious privacy costs, 
although perhaps less severe than the privacy costs of the compelled 
surgery at issue in Winston.169  If a computer is owned or shared by people 
who are not under suspicion, the privacy costs would typically increase 
further.170
However, these privacy costs will not always outweigh society’s need 
to investigate crimes.  Searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” 
can be justified when the public need for evidence rises to a sufficient 
level.
 
171  Courts regularly permit searches of homes and personal records,172 
despite the high privacy expected in those areas.173
Furthermore, digital searches create less of a practical intrusion than 




167 See generally cases summarized supra Part IV. 
  
168 Kerr, supra note 125, at 532. 
169 Winston, 470 U.S. at 753. 
170 Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2001). 
171 Winston, 470 U.S. at 759.  
172 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–25 (4th Cir. 2010) (permitting 
plain view discovery of gun in locked case during search of any container within a suspect’s 
house large enough to contain a data storage device); United States v. Reyerson, No. 3:09-
CR-66, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21237, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2010) (upholding removal 
of cabinet during search of mobile home for drugs). 
173 See U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“At the risk of belaboring the obvious, 
private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of 
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant . . . .”); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. 
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it important that this is not an area 
immediately adjacent to  a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.”). 
174 In fact, the Tamura decision cites a prior decision in which investigators were allowed 
to conduct an intermingled documents search without the supervision of a neutral magistrate 
when their search could be conducted on-site and would not require a seizure.  United States 
v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 n.4 (citing Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 
 
2010] SWINGING FOR THE FENCES 1615 
Large-scale document seizures have heightened privacy costs, because they 
deprive the owners of those documents the ability to access them while the 
search is conducted and require the prolonged presence of government 
agents on the owner’s property.175  By contrast, when conducting a digital 
search, government agents can, upon a showing of necessity to the 
magistrate, create a “bitstream copy” of the records.176  A bitstream copy is 
an exact reproduction of a digital record, and includes all data within the 
record, including hidden or even “deleted” files.177
When applying the Lerner Formula, magistrates must also weigh the 
public necessity of conducting a particular digital search.  One factor of 
central importance is the social cost of the crime being investigated, which 
will vary by case.
  The target of the 
warrant is able to keep their records, while the government is then able to 
execute the search warrant without causing undue interference.  Thus, the 
limited practical intrusion of digital searches may play an important role in 
a magistrate’s calculation of privacy costs in some cases. 
178
 
1053–54 (9th Cir. 1982) and distinguishing the case as involving a search, rather than a 
seizure). 
  However, magistrates should also take into account 
175 For a particularly egregious example, see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States 
Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432, 437 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (owner of electronic bulletin board 
had computers and disks seized; court found no valid reason why information sought could 
not be copied and equipment returned within hours), aff’d 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
176 United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“At the very least, the 
government should copy and return the equipment as soon as possible.”). 
177 Kerr, supra note 125, at 541.  A bitstream copy may contain deleted files because 
most computer hard drives, when directed to delete information, do not actually wipe the 
sectors of the hard drive containing that information clean.  Rather, they mark those sectors 
as a suitable location to overwrite with new data.  However, until that new data arrives, the 
“deleted” data remains in that location.  See Craig Ball, Computer Forensics for Lawyers 
Who Can’t Set the Clock on Their VCR, in 6 ON FORENSICS 29–30 (2005), available at 
http://www.craigball.com/cf_vcr.pdf. 
178 Professor Lerner’s article recognizes that varying probable cause requirements 
depending on the severity of the crime alleged is a “minority view” suggested by Justice 
Jackson’s dissent in United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160, 180–82 (1949) and Camara v. 
Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967).  Lerner, supra note 147, at 
1015–19.  Justice Jackson’s view has found some support from leading jurists, including 
Judge Friendly and Judge Posner.  See United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 
1968) (Friendly, J. dissenting) (“If [the] decision were mine to make, I would not be at all 
averse to straightforward recognition that the gravity of the suspected crime and the utility of 
the police action . . . are factors bearing on the validity of the search or arrest decision.”); 
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Posner, J.) (“The amount 
of information that prudent police will collect before deciding to make a search or an arrest, 
and hence the amount of probable cause they will have, is a function of the gravity of the 
crime, and especially the danger of its imminent repetition.”).  Ultimately the question of 
whether or not it is appropriate to consider the severity of the alleged crime is a subject of 
considerable debate.  See Kerr, supra note 125, at 581 (describing the practice of varying 
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the general need for the government to effectively detect and investigate 
crime in a digital age.  The increased availability of computing power and 
telecommunications has created new forms of crime and has made many 
existing crimes easier to commit.179  It also makes evidence of crime more 
difficult to detect or investigate due to the likelihood of mislabeling,180 or 
disguise,181 the exponentially increasing size of databases,182 and the 
widespread availability of encryption technology.183
 
permissible search procedures based on severity of offense “problematic”); Eugene Volokh, 
Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1983 (2004) (“We 
may all agree that there is a difference between murder and littering, but it doesn't follow 
that courts can create administrable lines that distinguish the various cases between the two 
extremes.”).  But see Jeffrey Bellin, Crime Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: 
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World 38–41 (S. Methodist Univ., Working 
Paper No. 64, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1692312 (arguing that considering crime severity may help limit the potential 
for new technologies to allow for particularly intrusive searches).  Ultimately, this question 
is not a focus of this Comment, which instead will focus on the public interest in conducting 
efficient digital investigations regardless of the crime investigated. 
  Digital crime also 
179 See Robin Bryant, The Challenge of Digital Crime, in INVESTIGATING DIGITAL CRIME 
1–11 (Robin Bryant, ed. 2008) (listing the inherent advantages of digital crimes, including 
spatial and temporal benefits, economies of scale, anonymity, “legislative lag,” and 
improved concealment); see also James J. Tomkovicz, The Effect of Technology on Fourth 
Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 319 n.5 (2002) (collecting 
examples of computer crimes).  See generally Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement, Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew Lourie, Acting Principal Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen. and Chief of Staff Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice). 
180 See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (“[I]t is precisely because computer files can be intermingled and 
encrypted that the computer is a useful criminal tool.”).  See generally Ross E. Mayfield, 
Investigative Strategy and Utilities, in FORENSIC COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION 105 
(Thomas A. Johnson, ed., 2006). 
181 See Whitson Gordon, Hide Secret Files in Office 2007 Documents, LIFEHACKER (May 
13, 2010), http://lifehacker.com/5538370/hide-secret-files-in-office-2007-documents. 
182 See Ziff, supra note 125, at 860–61 (noting the exponential growth of digital 
databases and the increasing impracticality of the approaches advocated in United States v. 
Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) and Winick, supra note 125); see also PETER 
GRABOWSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 70 (2d ed., 2007) (“[T]he metaphor of the needle in the 
haystack is not entirely inappropriate.  Even with automated search tools, finding that needle 
may be extremely difficult and time-consuming.”). 
183 See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (S.D. Tex 2009) (noting that 
investigators required two months to decode encrypted files); EOGAN CASEY, DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET 498 
(2d ed. 2004) (describing investigator difficulty in detecting activities of online child 
pornography distribution ring due to encryption).  In some cases, the very act of shutting 
down and seizing computer hardware can result in the permanent loss of encrypted data.  
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATIVE USES OF TECHNOLOGY: DEVICES, TOOLS, AND 
TECHNIQUES 51 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213030.pdf. 
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creates a sense of distance and anonymity that may encourage those likely 
to be deterred from committing conventional crimes to commit digital 
ones.184
Ultimately, the greatest advantage of establishing this system of 
balances is the efficient negotiation that can be encouraged by magistrates.  
If a magistrate rejects a search warrant application after finding that it 
carries an unduly high privacy cost, then an investigator responding to this 
decision must attempt to change the variables in the Lerner formula if she 
still wants to obtain a search warrant.  However, she typically cannot 
change the magistrate’s assessment of the search’s social costs.  And while 
improving the probability variable is possible in some cases, this will be 
impossible in many cases, especially if the investigation requires a digital 
search to proceed any further.  Therefore, the investigator will most often be 
forced to offer compromises in order to reduce the privacy costs. 
  Society has an interest in detecting both digital crimes and 
traditional crimes that now create digital evidence.  If courts fail to take 
these interests into account, they risk making an already complicated and 
difficult form of investigation even more so. 
These compromises will produce much more efficient results than the 
judicially-imposed processes contemplated in Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc.  Investigators will have their choice of what concessions to offer, and 
can suggest compromises that minimize impairment of the investigation 
while offering a sufficient reduction in privacy cost to obtain the approval 
of the magistrate.  For instance, in some cases investigators may have 
enough information about the target computer and the targeted files to 
develop a search protocol designed to minimize the amount of non-
pertinent material that comes into view.  In other cases, investigators may 
know little about the file systems of the target system and may have reason 
 
Additionally, federal officials recently discovered a Russian spy ring that communicated, in 
part, by using commonly-available steganography programs to hide communications in 
innocuous-looking image files.  Stuart Fox, How Russian Spies Hid Secret Codes in Online 
Photos, CSMONITOR.COM (June 30, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2010/0630/ 
How-Russian-spies-hid-secret-codes-in-online-photos.  The investigators discovered the 
hidden messages, not through sophisticated electronic surveillance, but by searching the 
homes of the spies and finding the password necessary to decrypt the messages written on a 
piece of paper next to a computer.  Noah Shachtman, FBI: Spies Hid Secret Messages on 
Public Websites, WIRED (June 29, 2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/ 
alleged-spies-hid-secret-messages-on-public-websites. 
184 See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such A Thing As “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM. 
LAW REV. 1, ¶125; Monique Mattei Ferraro & Joseph Sudol, Internet Crimes Against 
Children, in FORENSIC COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION 129, 131 (Thomas A. Johnson ed., 
2006). 
1618 VINCENT ANGERMEIER [Vol. 100 
to believe that the computer’s owner has mislabeled or disguised files.185  
Under these circumstances, rather than offering a search protocol to the 
magistrate, the investigators may suggest other concessions.186
The en banc Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision helpfully 
suggests what kinds of concessions they could make.  They could waive 
plain view for all documents that are not responsive to the warrant,
 
187 or 
simply waive it entirely.188  They could have the search conducted by 
technicians under the supervision of a magistrate.189  In circumstances 
where the digital databases belong to a third party not suspected of 
wrongdoing, the government could agree to conduct their search in 
collaboration with the database owner.190
 
185 Michael G. Noblett, Mark M. Pollitt, & Lawrence A. Presley, Recovering and 
Examining Computer Forensic Evidence, 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE COMM. 7 (2000), available at 
www.fbi.gov/hp/lab/fsc/backissue/oct2000/computer.htm (observing that there is “no such 
thing as generic computer science procedures” and that “evidence is likely to be significantly 
different every time a submission is received by the laboratory and will likely require an 
examination plan tailored to that particular evidence”). 
  If the contents of the file being 
searched for are already known, which can occur in some cases, the 
186 This process of negotiation renders unnecessary the third holding of Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., which required “disclos[ure of the] actual risks of destruction of 
information.”  See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).  Demanding that agents 
determine “actual risks of destruction,” is a requirement that is as daunting to agents as it is 
difficult for magistrates to enforce.  The negotiation process is a more effective way of 
ensuring that agents develop honest estimates of risk of destruction or disguise.  Agents must 
develop fair estimates of these risks, otherwise they will offer search concessions that make 
their search unnecessarily difficult. 
187 Recent Case, supra note 40, at 1009–10 (dubbing this the “responsive document 
approach”). 
188 CDT II, 579 F.3d at 997–98, 1006.  The degree to which waiver of plain view actually 
reduces privacy costs is something of an open question.  The knowledge that investigators 
may not use digital evidence against a target if that evidence was discovered while searching 
for evidence of an unrelated crime may decrease privacy concerns to an extent.  Nonetheless, 
they do not reduce the costs entirely, since the private files will still be viewed by 
government agents (or, under the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. approach, government 
technicians and possibly a supervising magistrate.)  The complex nature of privacy 
complicates these determinations about when privacy rights have been impaired and to what 
degree they have been impaired.  See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477 (2006) (categorizing modern privacy interests in four groups: information 
collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion). 
189 CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000–01, 1006. 
190 CDT offered some limited assistance to the government in determining where the 
records of the ten players could be found.  CDT I, 473 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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government could agree to use a hashing program to retrieve the file 
without viewing any other files in the computer.191
This negotiation process will encourage the government to develop 
efficient search methods that take into account the privacy concerns raised 
by digital searches while discouraging the existing temptation to claim that 
a file-by-file search is required in all cases.  The process does, however, 
require that magistrate judges take an active role in scrutinizing warrant 
applications and ensuring a balance.  Magistrates are increasingly familiar 
with digital searches and have been addressing the issues they pose for over 
a decade.
 
192  Although there is reason to expect that not all judges will 
enforce this system aggressively enough,193
C. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. AND REASONABLENESS 
 the benefits are significant, and 
the appellate courts should attempt to coordinate and guide the magistrate 
judges as much as is possible. 
Due to the heuristic nature of the Lerner Formula, it is difficult to 
conclusively say whether or not the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 
holding is incorrect.  However, the process used to reach it was undesirable, 
and it is clearly not an appropriate approach for all digital searches.  The 
government’s search of the CDT and Quest records did raise several 
sources of privacy cost.  The records were quasi-medical in nature and 
belonged to numerous third parties not under immediate suspicion of drug 
use.194  If such searches were permitted in the future, it might be impossible 
for the $620 million drug testing industry to remain operational due to their 
inability to guarantee the confidentiality of their test results.195
 
191 See, e.g., United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2010) (suspect 
is detected sharing particular files using a peer-to-peer file-sharing program and investigators 
conduct a search of his computer). 
  The search 
192 Supra Part IV.C. 
193 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 881, 888–89 (1991) (describing the modern warrant process as “slapdash” and 
“casual”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 (1988) (calling “the ‘rubber stamp’ quality of 
magistrate review of warrant applications”an “open scandal”). 
194 On the other hand, Barry Bonds did not believe that his results were confidential, and 
was concerned that Major League Baseball would leak his results to the media if they felt it 
necessary to do so.  See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 127.  Nonetheless, all 
participating players had been promised confidentiality by Major League Baseball and had 
been told that the purpose of the testing was to see if more than five percent of them tested 
positive, in which case further screening would be used.  CDT II, 579 F.3d at 993. 
195 MARKETDATA ENTERPRISES, INC., THE U.S. MEDICAL LABORATORIES INDUSTRY 10 
(9th ed. 2007) (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology). 
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of CDT and Quest carried what can be assumed to be well above-average 
privacy costs. 
Those privacy costs were not outweighed by the probability variable or 
the social costs of undetected crime.  Although the records were sure to 
contain drug testing results for the ten players, it is unclear whether or not it 
was strongly likely that those results would be positive.  The Government 
was investigating BALCO, a company that had specialized in developing 
undetectable performance-enhancing drugs.196  Furthermore, as Judge 
Thomas noted in his dissent in CDT I, a positive result would not have been 
conclusive proof of drug use.197  Additionally, the crime under investigation 
was not of a particularly severe nature, and did not immediately threaten 
human life.198  Finally, just as the police in Winston could have proven the 
suspect’s involvement in an armed robbery without retrieving the bullet, the 
BALCO investigation could likely have demonstrated the drug use of the 
targeted players without accessing the CDT databases.199
The Ninth Circuit approach does not strike an appropriate balance 
under the Lerner Formula.  Although the above-average privacy costs of the 
government search in this case require mitigation, it is not at all clear that 
all of the procedures required by the Ninth Circuit are necessary to restore 
the balance.  Simply requiring the government to develop a search protocol 
that could be reasonably expected to retrieve only the test results of the 
targeted players would have been sufficient to reduce the privacy costs to 
adequate levels.  As Judge Bea noted in his partial dissent, the drug test 
results of the ten players were located within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, 
along with many other baseball players.
 
200  However, the spreadsheet, when 
opened, only immediately displayed the names of the players; viewing the 
test results required investigators to scroll right.  Therefore, investigators 
could have easily adopted a search protocol whereby they would remove 
the results of the other baseball players before scrolling and viewing the test 
results.201
 
196 See supra note 
  It is therefore difficult to see how the additional procedural 
5. 
197 473 F.3d 915, 945 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
198 In contrast, Justice Jackson’s dissent in United States v. Brinegar uses the example of 
a kidnapped child to demonstrate a crime carrying high social costs.  338 U.S. 160, 183 
(1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
199 The Government may have been able to use the seized records of BALCO or obtain 
the cooperation of Victor Conte or other intermediaries to establish the use of performance-
enhancing drugs by the ten players.  FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 2. 
200 CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1016 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 
201 Id. 
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requirements advanced by the Ninth Circuit would produce anything more 
than marginal reductions in privacy cost.202
And while the redundancy of the Ninth Circuit procedures creates 
marginal benefits, they risk making all digital searches significantly more 
difficult and expensive to conduct.
 
203  For instance, the requirement that 
only specialized personnel be allowed to perform file segregation is 
unrealistic and expensive if applied to every digital search.204  To properly 
segregate pertinent files from non-pertinent files typically requires detailed 
knowledge of the investigation.205
 
202 The Ninth Circuit’s minimization procedures resemble (and probably exceed) the 
procedures regulating searches of records intermingled with documents protected by 
attorney–client privilege.  These procedures include the use of “taint teams”  or requiring 
searches to be conducted by magistrates in camera.  See, e.g., Klitzman, Klitzman and 
Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing the use of a special master to 
review documents seized from a law firm in camera); United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 
890, 905 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (upholding segregation by “taint team”).  Searches of records 
protected by attorney–client privilege carry extremely high privacy costs since they threaten 
to undermine constitutional rights to counsel.  Although the search of CDT’s drug records 
raise serious privacy concerns, it is difficult to see how the Ninth Circuit could conclude that 
the privacy costs were so high that search minimization procedures equal to or perhaps 
greater than those granted to searches of attorney–client communications were necessary.  
For an excellent discussion of searches of documents containing intermingled privileged 
documents, see Eric D. McArthur, Comment, The Search and Seizure of Privileged 
Attorney–Client Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 732 (2005) (comparing the 
privacy costs of searches of privileged documents to the compulsory surgery in Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)). 
  This is especially true in the execution 
203 The holding requiring the destruction of non-pertinent data, inasmuch as it applies to 
data not otherwise retainable under plain view, is uncontroversial.  CDT II, 579 F.3d at 
1000–01.  This seems clear under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) and implicit in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, given the lack of any legitimate governmental interest in retaining information 
unlawfully obtained and therefore “poisonous” to the investigation if utilized.  Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1963). 
204 CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000; see id. at 1013 (Callahan, J. concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (“To comply, an agency would have to expand its personnel, likely at a significant 
cost, to include both computer specialists who could segregate data and forensic computer 
specialists who could assist in the subsequent investigation.  The alternative would be to use 
an independent third party consultant, which no doubt carries its own significant expense.”). 
205 See EOGHAN CASEY DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET 90 (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]he success of [the investigative] 
process depends heavily on the experience and skill of the investigators, evidence examiners 
and crime scene technicians who must collaborate to piece the evidence together and 
develop a convincing account of the offense.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 101–02, 102 
fig.4.5 (listing the steps taken by investigators and examiners “working together” in the 
course of a digital investigation).  See generally ASS’N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, GOOD 
PRACTICES GUIDE FOR COMPUTER BASED ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 24 (2003), available at 
http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf 
(describing the analytical process by which the forensic examiner or other personnel review 
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of warrants for particular types of evidence, rather than known items or 
files. 
For instance, imagine a search warrant granted by a magistrate to 
search and seize “hardware, computer disks, [and] disk drives . . . which 
may be, or are used to visually depict child pornography, child erotica, 
information pertaining to the sexual interest in child pornography . . . or 
information pertaining to an interest in child pornography.”206  An 
experienced investigator with superior knowledge of the case at hand would 
be more (perhaps much more) likely to identify “information pertaining to 
an interest in child pornography” than a technician whose only involvement 
in the case is to extract and sort information from digital storage media.  To 
insist on such a requirement in all “normal[]”207 digital search cases is 
simply unrealistic, which is why no such requirement exists in traditional 
searches.208  In failing to evaluate reasonableness through a balancing of 
social interests and privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit has created an 
unsustainable system where the ability of the government to conduct 
efficient investigations arbitrarily depends on whether or not the evidence is 
digital or non-digital.209 
D. EX ANTE SEARCH RESTRICTIONS 
Professor Orin S. Kerr, a leading scholar on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of digital searches, has recently published an article 
responding to the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision.210  The paper 
creates two categories of responses to the constitutional questions raised by 
 
collects digital information for probative value after it has been retrieved by a forensic 
examiner). 
206 United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998). 
207 CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1000. 
208 For instance, the officers in Arizona v. Hicks were not required, after arresting the 
defendant, to send in “specialized personnel or an independent third party” to search the 
apartment for weapons or dead bodies.  480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987). 
209 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 08-5000, 2010 WL 251592, at *10 (4th Cir. 
Jan. 21, 2010) (concluding that searches of digital databases are not distinguishable from 
searches of filing cabinets on the basis of the amount of information inside database); Recent 
Case, supra note 40, at 1010 (“There is no justification for applying different standards to 
information contained in the same document depending on whether that document is still on 
a computer or has been printed out.”). 
210 Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1241 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation].  In addition to extensive writings on 
digital searches, cited supra, Professor Kerr authored the Department of Justice’s guidelines 
on digital searches.  ORIN S. KERR, SEARCHING & SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1st ed. 2001), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps11361/searchmanual.pdf. 
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digital searches: ex ante restrictions and ex post restrictions.  Ex ante 
restrictions are conditions such as those established by the Ninth Circuit, 
which dictate to the manner in which the search is to be conducted.211  Ex 
post restrictions are court decisions and precedents which limit the 
admissibility of evidence after the search has occurred.212
Professor Kerr argues that ex post restrictions should be the only tool 
at the disposal of courts for enforcing Fourth Amendment protections in 
digital search cases (or, apparently, any kind of government search).  First, 
Professor Kerr argues that magistrate judges lack authority to impose ex 
ante requirements other than particularity and probable cause.
  An example 
would be the review of the actions of the officer in Hicks and the finding of 
noncompliance with the Fourth Amendment based on his moving of the 
turntable during the search.  
213  Professor 
Kerr bases this assessment on a set of Supreme Court cases that, while not 
specifically addressing the authority of magistrates to establish ex ante 
restrictions in all cases, would seem to bring it into some doubt.  For 
instance, in the context of anticipatory warrants, the Court has rejected the 
argument that, in addition to the requirements of probable cause and 
particularity, there exists a requirement that the circumstances activating the 
warrant also be particularly described, suggesting that particularity and 
probable cause may be the only two requirements a magistrate can place on 
a search warrant.214  It has also held that magistrates cannot uphold their 
duties while directly participating in searches as if they were an “adjunct 
law enforcement officer”215 and that a warrant for a wiretap does not require 
additional language authorizing the act of entering the target’s residence to 
install the surveillance equipment.216  Additionally, in Richards v. 
Wisconsin, the Court cast doubt on whether or not ex ante restrictions are 
enforceable at all, when it upheld a search that disregarded an ex ante 
requirement to “knock and announce” prior to entering a suspect’s hotel 
room. 217
 
211 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 
 
210, at 1243–44. 
212 Id. at 1261. 
213 Id.   
214 See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006). 
215 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 321 (1979).  This case involved a 
magistrate who assisted a search for obscene materials by going to the adult bookstore with 
the officer, reviewing the obscene material seized there, and informing the searching officers 
of whether or not the materials met the constitutional requirements for obscenity.  Id. at 321. 
216 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
217 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
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Professor Kerr further argues that, regardless of the authority of 
magistrates to impose enforceable ex ante restrictions, ex ante restrictions 
are normatively undesirable and should be avoided.  Professor Kerr argues 
that, unlike ex post restrictions, ex ante restrictions tend to limit the ability 
for appellate courts to aid in the development of law in an area of law that is 
in need of more clarity as to what is and is not reasonable.218  The 
reasonableness determinations required for ex ante restrictions must also be 
made at a phase of an investigation where only a limited amount of 
information is available to the magistrate.  The number of digital media to 
be searched, their formatting, the likelihood of encryption, and other 
variables may not be known until the search is conducted, limiting the 
accuracy of reasonableness determinations and introducing constitutional 
error.219
Professor Kerr’s arguments are provocative and deserve a more 
thorough review than this Comment can provide.  Ex ante search 
restrictions, while not apparently adopted by the Supreme Court, have been 
adopted by several courts of appeals
  Professor Kerr concludes that, in the face of these difficulties, ex 
ante restrictions should be avoided. 
220 and a scattering of district courts.221
Professor Kerr concedes that the Supreme Court has not issued a 
definitive ruling on whether or not ex ante restrictions are permissible, 
leaving some room for debate.
  
Prohibiting them would result in the reversal of a significant swathe of 
appellate Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
222
 
218 Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 
  However, the approach advocated in this 
Comment circumvents that debate.  The ex ante requirements of 
particularity and probable cause are clearly permitted and this Comment’s 
approach is grounded in probable cause.  A magistrate reviewing a search 
warrant must assure that the probable cause requirement is met, and he 
cannot know what level of probable cause is required without assessing the 
overall reasonableness of the search.  Magistrates have the authority to deny 
210, at 1277–78. 
219 Id. 
220 The ex ante Tamura procedure is still valid precedent in the Ninth Circuit and has 
received positive appraisals in the Third and Tenth Circuits.  See United States v. Ninety-
Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars, 307 F.3d 137, 154 (3d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).  Similarly, the Third Circuit 
has advocated ex ante restrictions in the context of searches of law firm documents.  See 
Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984); see also United 
States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington D.C. 20515, 497 F.3d 
654, 656 (D.C. Cir 2007) (reviewing a government search pursuant to a warrant requiring 
“special procedures” for the search of a congressman's office). 
221 See supra note 119. 
222 Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1270. 
2010] SWINGING FOR THE FENCES 1625 
search warrants where the probable cause requirement is not met.  To the 
extent that the approach advocated in this Comment may result in ex ante 
restrictions on searches, it is important to note that those restrictions are 
self-imposed by the officials requesting the warrant, not the magistrate, who 
simply adjusts the probable cause required based on the reasonableness of 
the proposed search. 
This raises the question of the impact of Richards v. Wisconsin on the 
enforceability of ex ante search restrictions, since that case leaves the issue 
in some doubt.  Further clarification by the Supreme Court may be 
necessary, but, at present, the case seems distinguishable from most digital 
search cases.  The Richards v. Wisconsin case involved a “knock and 
announce” requirement and rejected its use as an ex ante requirement.223  
The “unannounced” entry occurred immediately after an officer attempted 
to enter a suspect’s hotel room disguised as hotel staff.  The suspect opened 
the door, noticed other officers in the hallway and slammed the door.224
Digital searches are not nearly as volatile.  Once the electronic media 
has been seized, it is fairly immune to destruction (unless the suspect has 
imposed highly sophisticated countermeasures).  The reasonableness factors 
surrounding the search do not change as much as they do in the 
circumstances presented in Richards.  Thus, Richards is more clearly 
understood as a limit on arbitrary or unsupported ex ante requirements, not 
all ex ante requirements. 
  At 
that point, due to the exigent circumstances and immediate potential for 
destruction of evidence (as implied by the slamming of the door) the 
reasonableness factors were significantly different than they had been when 
the magistrate issued the warrant.  Thus, the primary failure of the 
requirement in that case stemmed from the fact that the magistrate 
purported to evaluate the reasonableness of a particular aspect of a search 
(the reasonableness of unannounced entry) at a point in time in which the 
magistrate did not have sufficient information to make such a judgment. 
Beyond the question of inherent constitutional authority, there seems 
to be some authorization in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for ex 
ante restrictions in the context of digital searches.  Rule 41(e)(2)(B) was 
specifically created by a 2009 amendment to provide additional direction on 
warrants for electronically stored information.225
 
223 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1996). 
  The rule notes that 
224 Id. 
225 The rule provides:  
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the 
seizure or copying of electronically stored information.  Unless otherwise specified, the warrant 
authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.  The time for 
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although officers only need one warrant in order to both seize or copy 
electronic media and then review that material, that is only the default rule.  
If the magistrate “otherwise specifie[s]” then the default does not apply, 
meaning that a magistrate can authorize the initial seizure, but stay the 
review of the material.226
In an ex post-only system, this carve out would make little sense.  If 
the probable cause and particularity requirements justified the seizure, then 
there would be no justification for delaying a review of the seized material.  
Rather, this “otherwise specified” clause seems to provide for magistrates to 
develop a two-step warrant process, whereby a magistrate first issues a 
warrant authorizing the seizure and then, once there has been an opportunity 
to more closely assess the reasonableness of searching the seized media, 
issues a second warrant permitting the search of the seized material.  This 
two-phase system allows for the creation of post-seizure ex ante restrictions 
that are more likely to create real reductions in privacy cost than merely 
speculative ones.  It is difficult to see what purpose it would serve in an ex 
post-only regime and so seems to strongly infer that magistrates are 
authorized to exercise ex ante authority in some cases. 
 
Professor Kerr’s normative criticisms of ex ante restrictions make a 
persuasive case for at least limiting their use.  This Comment shares his 
concern with the potential for a one-size-fits-all system of ex ante search 
restrictions (such as the Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. restrictions) to 
result in constitutional error.  That is why this Comment’s approach ideally 
places the government in the metaphorical driver’s seat while the magistrate 
simply serves to let the government know when it has reached the 
destination.  The two-step process implied by Rule 41(e)(2)(B) provides an 
additional method for reducing constitutional error.  Once the computers 
have been seized, the magistrate is able to make a reasonableness 
determination with improved information about the amount of information 
seized and its potential to impose privacy costs.  There may even be an 
opportunity to conduct a full hearing, with briefings from both the 
government and the suspect regarding the reasonableness of the search.  
Additionally, once the data has been seized, the magistrate is in a better 
position to evaluate the effect of government-proposed ex ante restrictions, 
should they be found to be necessary.  The approach advocated in this 
Comment allows for adaptations that can reduce constitutional error. 
 
executing the warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of 
the media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or review. 
226 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B). 
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Similarly, Professor Kerr’s concern that permitting ex ante restrictions 
will retard the development of reasonableness case law in digital search 
cases is much more applicable to the blanket restrictions imposed by the 
Ninth Circuit, rather than the approach advocated in this Comment.  While 
it is impossible to know how often magistrates using this Comment’s 
approach would find it necessary to impose ex ante restrictions, it seems 
unlikely that it will happen in most cases.  Magistrates should not entertain 
ex ante restrictions whenever they feel it would be helpful to do so; they 
only come into play when the government’s requested search would violate 
the constitution without revision.  Furthermore, as Professor Kerr notes in 
his paper, magistrates can be somewhat cursory in their review of search 
warrant requests.227
In general, the approach advocated in this Comment seeks to resolve 
the central problem of digital searches: the creation of circumstances where 
magistrates must choose between society’s need to investigate and deter the 
growing number of crimes involving computers and the peculiar privacy 
costs caused by the massive intermingling of data on electronic media.  Ex 
ante restrictions, despite the name, actually serve the purpose of allowing 
government searches that would not otherwise be permissible to go forward 
while ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements 
are satisfied.  Unlike ex post restrictions, they can be selected based both on 
their convenience to the investigators and their potential for reductions in 
privacy cost.  They also will tend to provide some guidance to investigators 
in complex or novel digital investigations, providing a path forward that 
reduces the risk of an important investigation being sacrificed at the altar of 
ex post reasonableness case law. 
  This would probably result in most digital searches 
proceeding only with ex post restrictions, with the ex ante restrictions 
reserved for exceptionally problematic searches, such as the Comprehensive 
Drug Testing Inc. search.  Thus, to the extent that ex ante restrictions may 
limit the ability of appellate courts to develop the law, a majority of digital 
searches will be likely to be conducted with no ex ante restrictions, 
providing appellate courts with ample opportunity to develop a case law 
surrounding the reasonableness of digital searches. 
E. REASONABLENESS AND PRACTICALITY 
The Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. holding clearly springs from 
the concern that, by combining plain view with the ostensible need to 
conduct file-by-file searches, the government has discovered a major 
 
227 See Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 210, at 1283. 
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loophole to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.228  However, it is 
important not to overestimate the value of this system to the government.  
Under the plain view doctrine, investigators must have probable cause to 
believe that an item seized has an “immediately apparent” connection to an 
illegal act.229  Traditional examples of items satisfying the requirement 
include firearms in the homes of known felons, modified rifles, marijuana 
seeds, and child pornography.230  In contrast, establishing the requirement 
for documents seized in plain view can be a very difficult task.231  Very few 
computer files are contraband in nature, with child pornography being the 
primary exception.232  Similarly, most other files on computers are text-
based documents and thus have the same difficulty meeting the requirement 
as their physical counterparts, namely, the need for further inspection to 
develop the context for probable cause.233  For example, an officer 
searching a computer for evidence of a kidnapping would not find a 
fraudulent tax return to be immediately apparent.234
 
228 See CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The sequence of events supports the 
suspicion that representations in the warrant about the necessity for broad authority to seize 
materials were designed to give the government access to the full list of professional baseball 
players and their confidential drug testing records.”).  Judge Kozinski has indicated that his 
skepticism towards plain view may extend to non-digital contexts as well.  See supra note 
  Since the “immediately 
42. 
229 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 466 (1971); see also United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 510 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“The immediately apparent requirement is a vital constraint on the plain view exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”). 
230 See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 4 (1982) (marijuana seeds); United 
States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010) (machine gun and silencer); United 
States v. Lemus, 582 F.3d 958, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (known felon with firearm); United 
States v. Norris, No. CR 05-2323-TUC-CKJ, 2006 WL 798667, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 
2006) (modified firearm). 
231 See, e.g., Garcia, 496 F.3d at 511 (discussing documents requiring “further 
investigation” and not establishing probable cause of crime upon “immediate sensory 
perception” not immediately apparent); United States v. Jimenez, 205 Fed. Appx. 656, 662 
n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that, “unlike firearms in a felon’s residence, letters do not 
immediately appear to be evidence of a crime”); Doane v. United States, No. 08 Mag. 
0017(HBP), 2009 WL 1619642, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2009); see also United States v. 
Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 586–87 (D. Vt. 1998) (surveying document-based case law 
predating the probable cause requirement defined in Hicks). 
232 See Clancy, supra note 125, at 201. 
233 See Garcia, 496 F.3d at 511.  There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule.  
See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2010) (mobile device seized incident to arrest 
displays image of owner, a known felon, holding a firearm). 
234 See also Ziff, supra note 125, at 869 (positing that investigators undertaking a digital 
search for child pornography could open a file called “letter-to-grandma.doc” on the grounds 
that it might contain images of child pornography, but that the investigators could not justify 
reading any text contained within that document). 
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apparent” requirement cannot be satisfied retroactively and must be 
established for every single file seized under plain view, the valid seizure of 
non-pertinent digital evidence would be rare.235  Even in Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., it is possible that many of the non-BALCO drug records 
discovered would not meet this test due to legal or legitimate explanations 
for the test results observed by the officers.236
The finite resources of investigators pose an additional limit on digital 
plain view.  As has been noted, pertinent files can easily be disguised and 
only discovered by a detailed, file-by-file search.  However, as memory 
capacity increases at a rapid pace, such searches become increasingly 
difficult to perform.
 
237  File-by-file searches must proceed without regard to 
file names, formats, or creation dates, since they are premised on the theory 
that those are unreliable.238  Indeed, at least one court has concluded that 
these file-by-file searches cannot open files with names indicative of 
unrelated crimes, due to the unlikelihood of a criminal disguising a file by 
giving it an incriminating name.239
However, each procedure must be transparent for these limitations to 
be effective.  Perjury by officers is a significant threat to Fourth 
Amendment protections, due to the large number of exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.
  Investigators thus have a strong 
incentive to avoid conducting file-by-file searches in many instances. 
240
 
235 See id. at 867; United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1985). 
  Those concerns are heightened in the digital search 
236 See CDT I, 473 F.3d 915, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“It was clear 
under the testing protocol that positive tests did not necessarily reflect steroid use; the use of 
nutritional supplements—which is common in professional sports—could also yield a false 
positive.  In addition, there are a whole host of legitimate reasons for individuals to be 
prescribed steroid products.”). 
237 PETER GRABOWSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 70 (2d ed. 2007); Ziff, supra note 125, at 
860–61 (describing a search by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office that required 200 
terabytes of information to be searched, which is equivalent to a 4,200 mile-high stack of 
paper).  But see Kerr, supra note 125 at 569–70 (noting that computer searches are 
somewhat easier to conduct than physical searches of a residence, because they can be done 
by one person and the search does not have to be done in the field). 
238 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding 
file-by-file search on grounds that it was conducted systematically, opening files in the order 
in which they appeared in the directory, regardless of their name); accord United States v. 
Mann, 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). 
239 See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding 
that officers conducting a search for documents related to tax fraud lacked probable cause to 
believe that encrypted files with names suggestive of child pornography might contain 
information pertinent to their search). 
240 See Stuntz, supra note 193, at 938 (“If the law prevents perjury in cases of one type 
but not of another, a dishonest officer can simply re-describe the case changing his story to 
take advantage of whatever opportunities the law gives him.”); see also Christopher 
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context, since digital searches are conducted in private settings, where no 
independent witness can dispute an officer’s testimony.  Additionally, while 
a judge may be able to detect inconsistencies in perjured testimony 
regarding a conventional search, they may have more difficulty doing so in 
a highly technical context.  Therefore, a defendant in a digital search case 
must be allowed to analyze the search methods used by the government to 
determine whether the government discovered illicit materials by 
conducting improper searches—that is, searches that are not conducted in a 
systematic manner.241  Technology has made creating these records simple 
and inexpensive.242  Recording software can easily and unobtrusively 
record the process of a hard drive search.243  Furthermore, the use of 
bitstream copies allows digital searches to be replicated—a police 
technician could be asked to state the search procedure that was used to 
discover a particular piece of evidence and then asked to demonstrate how 
that evidence was discovered on a copy of the target hard drive.244  Such a 
process would give defense counsel many opportunities to detect violations 
of Fourth Amendment rights and found a suppression motion on it.245
Still, even though the potential for widespread abuse of digital plain 
view is limited by finite resources, it is not a complete solution.  
Government investigators may hold their resources in reserve, and use them 
 
 
Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 
(1996). 
241 For example, abandoning a search for evidence of drug distribution to search for child 
pornography.  United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). 
242 See, e.g., DemoCreator: Record Everything on Computer Screen and Create Engaged 
Simulations, WONDERSHARE SOFTWARE, http://sameshow.com/images/brochure/ 
democreator-brochurex.pdf (offering retail software for recording computer activity).   
243 Id. 
244 Note that this ability to scrutinize the search step-by-step goes a long way towards 
resolving Judge Kozinski’s concerns about abuse of plain view in conventional searches, 
particularly the ability of officers to lie about how they came to view objects.  See supra 
note 41. 
245 However, courts have so far been reluctant to require agents to keep records of search 
progress and to require those records be provided to defendants.  See United States v. Jack, 
No. CR.S-07-0266 FCD, 2009 WL 453051, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (denying a 
discovery motion for search methodology on grounds that warrant permitted government to 
open every file on computer); United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (finding it unnecessary to maintain record of text searches conducted by agents in face 
of agent testimony that the searches pertained to the issues raised in the warrant).  But see 
United States v. Frabizio, 341 F. Supp. 2d 47, 47 (D. Mass. 2004) (granting motion under 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) for discovery of computer search software used by government 
to scan and detect child pornography on defendant’s computer). 
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to target the unpopular or politically disfavored.246  The Lerner Formula 
requirements regarding reasonable searches are therefore indispensible.  
However, these practical considerations support the proposition that digital 
data storage and personal computing are not such a radical change from 
existing criminal procedure doctrine that radically expanded protections are 
necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The rapid expansion of digital technology and its increasing use does 
raise serious privacy considerations, including difficult questions 
concerning government and private data mining,247 cybervigilantism,248 
searches of digital media incident to arrest,249 RFID tracking,250 
biometrics,251 and other technologies.252  Still, more of our private details 
 
246 See Kerr, supra note 125, at 567 (“[T]he ability to engage in pretextual searches may 
permit the police to target unpopular or politically powerless persons or groups for 
heightened scrutiny . . . .  This discriminatory and inefficient practice was just the kind of 
misuse of government power the Fourth Amendment was created to stop.”).  Arguably, the 
federal investigation into Allegheny County Coroner Cyril Wecht represents an example of 
this kind of abuse.  See United States v. Wecht, 619 F. Supp. 2d 213, 248 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(finding warrant permitting seizure of laptop and all data stored within laptop overbroad in a 
political corruption case); Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public 
Confidence in Our Federal Justice System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. (2007) (Testimony of Fmr. Att’y Gen. Dick Thornburgh) (suggesting that the 
prosecution of County Coroner Wecht, a Democrat, by a Republican U.S. Attorney was 
politically motivated); Jason Cato, Prosecution’s Conduct in Wecht Case Labeled 
“Troubling,” PITTSBURG TRIBUNE-REV. (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/ 
pittsburghtrib/news/s_562027.html. 
247 See SOLOVE, supra note 142; Christopher W. Clifton, et al., Data Mining and 
Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
CONVERSATION 191 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006). 
248 See United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Steiger, 
318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003); PETER GRABOSKY, ELECTRONIC CRIME 98–102 (2006). 
249 See Adam M. Gershowitz, The IPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 27 (2008); see, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, No. 3:08-CR-143, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71057 (E.D. Tenn. June 4, 2009). 
250 See Ari Juels, RFID Privacy: A Technical Primer for the Non-Technical Reader, in 
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 57–73 
(Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds. 2006).  RFID is an acronym for “Radio-
Frequency Identification.”  An “RFID tag” is a tiny, inexpensive chip that transmits a 
uniquely identifying number over short distances.  Id. at 57.  Their increasing ubiquity is 
raising privacy concerns in several areas.  See, e.g., M.L. Wald, New High-Tech Passports 
Raise Concerns of Snooping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at 28. 
251 See Lisa S. Nelson, Constructing Policy: The Unsettled Question of Biometric 
Technology and Privacy, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 152–72 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 
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are becoming digitized.  Technology will continue to develop new ways 
that that information can be stored, distributed, seized and stolen.  
Therefore, it is important that the courts adopt a flexible approach, similar 
to the flexible approach used in many conventional searches.  By working 
to balance public interests with privacy interests on a case-by-case basis, 
magistrates can encourage the efficient administration of justice and 
constitutional protections.  While Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 
proposes a solution that may work in extreme cases, it is not appropriate in 
all cases.  Its impracticality risks ceding the argument to the more 
conventional approaches of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, which 
themselves may be inadequate to protect Fourth Amendment rights in all 
cases.  A flexible approach based on balancing of interests presents the 
most sustainable option for courts seeking to address the Fourth 
Amendment concerns raised by digital searches. 
 
2006).  Popular culture has begun to reflect concerns regarding biometric privacy.  See, e.g., 
MINORITY REPORT (Amblin Entertainment 2002). 
252 See U.S. v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 853–55 (2d Cir. 1990) (Weinstein, J. dissenting) 
(listing technological improvements in forensic science and expressing concern about the 
Fourth Amendment implications of their aggregated use). 
